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Empirical Economics and the Study of Punishment
and Crime
Thomas J Miles

Upon first impression, economics might appear to be the discipline that has the least to contribute to the study of punishment and crime. A discipline traditionally concerned with financially-motivated market activity might seem to have little relevance to punishment and crime, subjects that usually involve
issues of moral culpability.' However, economics is an approach
to understanding a wide range of human behaviors, including
crime and the imposition of punishment.2 This article argues
that economics, especially empirical economics, has much to contribute to the study of punishment and crime. It focuses on three
features of economics that are especially salient: (1) the economic
conception of punishment and crime; (2) the empirical methodologies of economics; and (3) the normative metric of efficiency.
First, economics provides a crisp model of how an individual
behaves in the presence of legal rules and particularly how the
individual responds to the presence of criminal punishments.
Economics uses as its central conceptual framework decisionmaking by individuals. This framework comports with common
intuitions about human behavior. Most of us do the best we can
with what we have, or in the parlance of economics, we maximize
our utility subject to constraints. In the context of criminal behavior, gains from criminal activity may increase utility but the
threat and actual imposition of punishment are potentially significant constraints on the decision to participate in crime. This
conception of behavior places relatively little emphasis on the
social processes and psychological context of offending. In its ab1 Olin Fellow in Law and Economics, University of Chicago Law School. B.A., Tufts
University; Ph.D. (Economics), University of Chicago; J.D., Harvard Law School. The
author thanks participants in the symposium for helpful comments.
1 See Alvin K Kievorick, Legal Theory and the Economic Analysis of Torts and
Crimes, 85 Colum L Rev 905, 916-19 (1985) (arguing that moral rather than economic
concepts explain the existence of the criminal category).
2 Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior3-14 (Chicago 1976).
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straction from these factors, economics does not imply that they
are unimportant; in fact, economists are increasingly incorporating such factors into their formal, mathematical models. Rather,
by examining factors that are not context-specific, economic
analysis attempts to make predictions about the impact of crimecontrol policies that are sufficiently general to be valuable to a
broad range of policymakers.
A second advantage of economics is the relative rigor of its
empirical analysis. A priority in economists' empirical analyses is
to differentiate correlation from causation because economics
assumes human behavior is rational or purposeful. A convincing
test of the economic model shows more than mere correlations. A
convincing test would not just identify that incentives and behavior appear to move together. It would confirm or refute that a
change in a particular incentive caused a movement in observed
behavior. Identifying the direction of causal flow requires considerable care in excluding the possibility that some unmeasured
third factor accounts for the observed phenomenon. The distinction has import for more than just academics. Causal connections, and particularly the causes of crime rather than its mere
correlates, are the relationships of interest for the appropriate
design of public policy.
Third, economics provides a clear metric for evaluating the
success of a criminal justice policy. The normative criterion of
economics is efficiency, and efficiency implies an optimal level of
law enforcement. In practice, this objective is implemented by
comparing estimates of the costs and benefits of a policy.
This paper describes how these aspects of economicstestable implications, attention to issues of causation, and an
evaluation of costs and benefits-are salient to understanding
punishment and crime. Part I describes the economic model of
criminal behavior and discusses how economists have attempted
to evaluate or test the model empirically.3 In particular, it describes how economists have given special attention to issues of
causation in measuring the effect of incarceration rates on crime
rates. Previous researchers, who did not pay particular attention
to causation, erroneously concluded that incarceration has little
impact on crime rates. This section discusses how one economist
3 See Steven D. Levitt and Thomas J. Miles, The EmpiricalStudy of Criminal Pun-

ishment, in A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, eds, The Handbook of Law and
Economics (forthcoming 2005) (reviewing this literature); Steven D. Levitt, Deterrence,in
Joan Petersilia and James Q. Wilson, eds, Crime: Public Policiesfor Crime Control 435
(ICS 2002) (same).
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used "natural experiments" to identify the direction of causal
flow. It also describes how economists are beginning to explore
whether deterrence or incapacitation is the primary mechanism
through which incarceration reduces crime.
Part II focuses on another criminal justice institution, one
that more overtly utilizes condemnation of the offender. It examines the television program Amezica's Most Wanted. Critics of
the program argue that it promotes unnecessarily vindictive attitudes, while program producers contend that it provides a social
benefit as it contributes to hastening the apprehensions of fugitives. This section describes how an economist assessed this
claim. Empirical economics contributes to this evaluation by providing measurement of the consequential aspects of the program.
Although empirical economics cannot measure all of the relevant
quantities, it can assess this crucial one.
I. THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIME

A.

The Economic Model of Crime

The modern economic approach to criminal behavior began
with Gary Becker's seminal article, which furnished a formal
economic model of illegal behavior.4 In Becker's model, potential
offenders are rational or purposeful actors who compare the expected costs of criminal activity to the expected benefits.5 When
the latter exceeds the former, the actor commits crime.6 This conception of criminal activity contrasts with the views of crime
prevalent in criminology. Criminologists have theorized crime
alternatively as biologically determined,7 or the consequence of a
discrepancy between societal goals and the means available to
achieve them,' or a learned or culturally transmitted activity.9
Economics often abstracts from the biological, psychological, and
social processes influencing crime and conceives of crime as the
result of individual choice.1" However, some economists in recent
4 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Pumishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J Polit Econ
169 (1968).
5 Id at 209.

Id at 176-79.
See, for example, William H. Sheldon, The Varieties of Human Physique 254-59
(Harper 1940).
s See, for example, Robert K Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure 176-94
(Free Press 1957).
9 See, for example, Edwin Sutherland, The ProfessionalThief(Chicago 1937).
10 See Becker, 76 J Polit Econ at 170 (cited in note 4) (suggesting that an economic
approach "can dispense with special theories of anomie, psychological inadequacies, or
6

7
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years have begun to develop models analyzing the role of social
effects on criminal activity." These models do not abandon the
rational actor conception of criminal behavior; rather they attempt to provide a richer account of the incentives and constraints facing the decisionmaker.
In the economic model of crime, policymakers have two
mechanisms by which to reduce criminal activity: the probability
of apprehension and the magnitude of the sanction. 2 Crime reduction is costly for society because the probability of apprehension requires employing police and prosecutors. 3 In the canonical
model, the sanction is envisioned as a fine, rather than imprisonment, and fines, as pure transfers, require no expenditure of
resources. However, other punishments, such as imprisonment,
are readily incorporated into the model. Economists have developed numerous extensions of the basic economic model that include a wide range of complications, such as limited information,
enforcement error, risk preferences, and the corruption of law
enforcers.' 4 However, a central insight of the model is that criminal sanctions reduce crime through deterrence. A larger expected
sanction reduces the attractiveness of criminal activity relative
to legitimate pursuits. Although some economists have extended
the model to incorporate incapacitation, 5 criminal sanctions in
the traditional formulation of the economic model operate
through the potential offender's ex ante decisionmaking rather
than ex post constraints on his opportunity set.
The economic model of crime describes not only the choice of
the individual offender; it also makes recommendations about
the crime-control policies that society should adopt. Just as an
individual maximizes utility subject to constraints, society in the
model seeks to minimize the sum of expected losses from crime
inheritance of special traits and simply extend the economist's usual analysis of choice").
" See, for example, Oren Bar-Gill and Alon Harel, Crime Rates andExpected Sanctions: The Economics of Deterrence Revisited, 30 J Legal Stud 485 (2001) (modeling the
role of social sanctions in crime rates); Edward L. Glaeser, Bruce Sacerdote, and Jose A.
Scheinkman, Crime and SocialInteractions, 111 Q J Econ 507 (1996) (presenting a model
in which variation in the degree of social interactions influences the incidence of crime);
Raaj K. Sah, Social Osmosis andPatternsof Crime, 99 J Polit Econ 1272 (1991) (offering
a model in which an offender's perception of the probability of punishment is endogenous).
12 See Becker, 76 J Polit Econ at 177-78 (cited in note 4).
13 See id at 174.
14 See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis ofLaw, in Alan J. Auerbach and Martin Feldstein, eds, The Handbook ofPublic Economics 1661 (Elsevier 2005)

(reviewing the theoretical economics literature on public law enforcement).
" See, for example, Steven Shavell, A Model of Optimal Incapacitation,77 Am Econ
Rev 107 (1987).
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and the costs of law enforcement. In addition to generating recommendations, some implications of the efficiency analysis of
public law enforcement are consistent with existing patterns of
punishment. First, the cost difference in the two components of
the expected punishment implies an optimal or efficient structure of sanctions in the economic model. For a given level of deterrence, an efficient or optimal sanction is the combination of a
probability of apprehension and a magnitude of the sanction that
minimizes social costs. If policing is costly but fines are not, economics predicts that larger fines should be substituted for a
higher risk of apprehension.1 6 Similarly, if two types of punishment are available rather than just one, and they differ in their
costs of imposition, efficiency is enhanced by substituting the less
costly penalty for the more costly one. 7 For example, fines could
be used instead of incarceration.
A second implication of the economic model is that the goal
of public law enforcement is not the elimination of criminal activity altogether. When greater penalties reduce crime by more
than the social cost of imposing them, the economic model predicts that society may gain from the imposition of greater penalties. Conversely, when the benefit of crime-reduction is less than
the cost of imposing a particular penalty, an economic analysis
recommends forgoing the penalty. For example, when imprisoning more offenders produces a benefit of reduced crime in excess
of the cost of the higher incarceration rate, the economic prescription is that society should incarcerate more frequently. But,
if the costs of incarceration produce relatively modest benefits of
crime reduction--or none at all-an economic analysis suggests
that society should reduce the frequency of incarceration.
This equalization of the costs and benefits of a particular
crime-control policy has a broader implication about the nature
of public law enforcement. It suggests that society should expend
resources on crime-fighting policies up to the point at which the
benefits they generate in terms of reduced crime roughly equal
the costs of the policies. An implication of this prediction, one
that is often surprising to the layperson, is that public law en-

16 But see Becker, 76 J Polit Econ at 180-85 (cited in note 4) (discussing the possibil-

ity of reducing crime by minimizing the probability of detection and maximizing the magnitude of the sanction). See also A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The Optimal
TradeoffBetween the Probabilityand Magnitude of Fines, 69 Am Econ Rev 880 (1979)
(incorporating risk preferences into the analysis of optimal sanctions).
17 Becker, 76 J Polit Econ at 180-85 (cited in note 4).
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forcement does not seek to eliminate all criminal activity."8 As a
theoretical matter, society could likely eradicate crime entirely
by pouring vast resources into the complete enforcement of all
criminal laws. But, at some point, the cost of eliminating the
marginal (and hence minor) crime would likely exceed the benefit
of doing so. This implication explains why society expends enormous resources on combating crime, while at the same time a
positive crime rate persists.
Third, economics predicts that punishments increase with
the severity of the offense. The punishment for murder, for example, is greater than that for petty larceny. When the imposition of punishments, such as imprisonment, is costly, the assignment of a large punishment for an offense inflicting a small
amount of harm would be socially wasteful. Conversely, when a
punishment is too small to deter a large harm, society could gain
by imposing a larger sanction. The punishment for a particular
offense therefore corresponds roughly to the harm it inflicts.
A difficulty with the escalating scale of sanctions is the incentive for deterrence on the margin. If the penalty for a particular offense is very large, it may dissuade its commission ex ante.
Yet, when the difference between the expected punishment for
one offense and a second, more severe offense is small, a criminal
who chooses to undertake the first offense has little reason to
refrain from also committing the second. The escalating scale of
punishments in this circumstance provides only a weak incentive
for an offender to forgo the second offense. The difficulty of structuring penalties in this circumstance is known as the problem of
arranging "marginal deterrence."1 9
In sum, the economic model is "economic" in two senses.
First, it is economic in that its actors are purposeful or rational
decisionmakers who maximize their utility and in doing so, respond to the incentives created by criminal punishments. Second,
the model is economic in that it employs efficiency as a metric for
evaluating criminal law and criminal justice policies. The
evaluative criterion has normative content. But, it retains some
explanatory power in that it accords largely with the sorts of in
18 See George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J Polit Econ 526,
526-27 (1970) (noting that because society only enforces its laws to the extent that it can
afford to, it must forego "complete" law enforcement).
19 See id at 527-29 (describing the problem of marginal deterrence and how it acts as
a limitation on punishment); Steven Shavell, A Note on MarginalDeterrence,12 Intl Rev
L & Econ 345 (1992) (elaborating upon Stigler's theory of marginal deterrence and concluding that marginal deterrence only requires sanctions to rise with harms when enforcement is of a general nature).
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criminal punishments that society imposes. The next section describes how economists have attempted to confirm or refute the
behavioral model of economics by examining patterns of offending.
Empirical Evaluation of the Economic Model

B.

Much of the empirical evaluation of the economic model of
crime analyzes whether increases in expected sanctions reduce
the incidence of crime. Empirical analyses remain focused on this
fundamental question partly because of the difficulty in distinguishing correlation and causation. A correlation means that two
variables tend to move together. The co-movement of two variables does not necessarily imply that one variable causes the
other because some unobserved third variable may account for
their co-movement. For example, automobile traffic on weekends
in Las Vegas, Nevada is usually heavy. Weekend visitors to Las
Vegas typically depart with significantly less money than they
possessed upon arrival. In Las Vegas, bad traffic therefore correlates with monetary losses. Nonetheless, the traffic jams do not
cause visitors to lose their money.
Even when two variables are causally related, a correlation
does not reveal the direction of causation. For example, pedestrians often carry umbrellas when it rains. The appearance of umbrellas therefore correlates with precipitation. The pedestrians'
carrying their umbrellas, however, does not cause rain to fall.
The causal direction is surely the opposite. In order to make a
proper empirical evaluation of the economic model, the identification of causal relationships and the direction of causal flows
are therefore crucial.2" In addition, crime-control policies succeed
only if they are constructed with some knowledge of the causes of
criminal behavior and some estimates of the relative importance
of these factors.
The difficulty of disentangling causation and correlation particularly besets empirical assessments of the economic model of
crime, because of the so-called simultaneity or endogeneity of
criminal justice policies and crime rates. In other words, crime
rates both determine and are determined by crime-control policies. For instance, the criminal justice system usually receives
greater resources when crime rates are higher. This tendency
20

See, for example, Bar-Gill and Harel, 30 J Legal Stud at 499 (cited in note 11)

(stating that attempts to draw policy implications from studies on deterrence may be
flawed because crime rates may have significant effects on expected sanctions).
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produces a positive correlation between certain crime-control
policies and crime rates."' Inferring from this correlation, however, that these policies cause a greater frequency of crime or
that these policies are not effective in controlling crime is inappropriate. An empirical examination of a criminal justice policy
that fails to isolate the direction of causal flow provides a potentially misleading test of the economic model of crime as well as a
poor evaluation of the policy's success or failure.
In the past decade, empirical economists have made progress
in disentangling the direction of causal flows for certain criminal
justice policies.22 Their evidence suggests that certain crimecontrol policies, such as policing 3 and incarceration,2 4 reduce
crime rates. However, economists have found less frequent opportunities to evaluate whether these reductions in crime accrue
from deterrence or from incapacitation. In the few instances in
which they have sought to identify the operative mechanism,
their estimates suggest that both deterrence and incapacitation
may contribute to crime control.2"
Although a comprehensive review of the already-large and
still-growing empirical literature by economists on criminal activity lies beyond the scope of this paper,26 a discussion of a few
of its contributions makes apparent its central challenges and
advancements. For example, a crucial question in criminal justice is whether incarceration reduces crime. An economic analysis predicts that incarceration reduces criminal activity through
general deterrence, and if offenders recidivate, through incapacitation. However, some argue that the supply of offenders is perfectly elastic, meaning that if one offender is imprisoned, another
steps forward to take his place in criminal endeavors.2 7 Others
21

For example, a state may respond to a high crime rate by incarcerating more of-

fenders. Steven D. Levitt, The Effect ofPrisonPopulationSize on Crime Rates: Evidence
from Prison OvercrowdingLitigation, 111 Q J Econ 319, 322 (1996).
22 See Levitt and Miles, The EmpiricalStudy of CriminalPumshment (cited in note
3) (reviewing this literature).
23 For a review of this literature, see Lawrence W. Sherman, FairandEffective Policing, in Petersilia and Wilson, eds, Crime: Pubhlic Policies for Crime Control435 (cited in
note 3).
24 See, for example, Steven D. Levitt, 111 Q J Econ 319 (cited in note 21).
25 See, for example, Steven D. Levitt, Why Do IncreasedArrest Rates Appear to Reduce Crime: Deterrence, Incapacitation,or Measurement Error 36 Econ Inquiry 353
(1998).
26 For a contemporary review of empirical economic research on the impact and operation of the criminal justice system, see Levitt and Miles, The Empirical Study of
CriminalPunishment(cited in note 3).
27 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Cziminal Law, 85
Colum L Rev 1193, 1216 (1985) (noting that incapacitation may not be effective if the
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claim that the experience of incarceration increases the likelihood that an offender will recidivate upon release.2" Imprisonment may constrain legitimate opportunities by eroding human
capital and stigmatizing the offender.29 In addition, an imprisoned offender may acquire access to criminal networks and learn
skills from fellow inmates that are useful to the commission of
crime. 30 As a result, upon release, employment in the legitimate
sector is relatively less attractive. The impact of higher incarceration rates on aggregate crime rates is therefore an empirical
question.
The first scholars to consider the impact of incarceration
rates on the incidence of crime examined only national trends.3
Prison populations expanded considerably in the 1970s and
1980s, while crime rates rose steadily until the 1990s.32 In effect,
incarceration rates correlated positively with crime rates over
this period. Some scholars concluded that this positive correlation was evidence that incarceration did not reduce aggregate
crime rates.3 3 This conclusion failed to recognize that, like umbrellas appearing on rainy days, higher incarceration rates are
themselves partly a response to crime rates.
In the 1990s, several economists attempted to address the
simultaneity problem by taking more sophisticated approaches to
the data,3" and they drew different conclusions about the relasupply of offenders is perfectly elastic).
28 See John H. Laub and Robert J. Sampson, UnderstandingDesistance from Crime,
28 Crime & Just 1, 57 (2001) (finding that criminal sanctions directly influence social
bonds to employment such that "incarceration as a juvenile and as a young adult had a
negative effect on later job stability, which in turn was negatively related to continued
involvement in crime over the life course").
29 See id ("[D]elinquent behavior has a systematic attenuating effect on the social and
institutional bonds that normally link adults to society (e.g., labor force attachment,
marital cohesion).").
30 See id at 30.
31 See, for example, Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, The Scale ofImprisonment 121-24 (Chicago 1991) (evaluating the relationship between crime rates and prison
population against the aggregate American experience from 1950 to 1990).
32 Levitt and Miles, Empirical Study of CriminalPunishment(cited in note 3) (providing national incarceration and crime rates as the background for a discussion of the
literature on the correlation between these rates that took place in the 1990s).
33 See, for example, Zimring and Hawkins, The Scale ofImprisonment (cited in note
31).
3 See Levitt, 111 Q J Econ at 322-23 (citied in note 21) (using state prison overcrowding litigation to avoid simultaneity bias in the evaluation of the impact of prison
populations on crime rates); Thomas B. Marvell and Carlisle Moody, Jr., Prison Population Growth and Crime Reduction, 10 J Quantitative Criminol 109, 110 (1994) (arguing
that when estimating the impact of imprisonment on crime, regression analysis is a better means of avoiding the simultaneity problem than the use of annual crime rates for
active offenders).
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tionship between imprisonment and crime.3 5 A leader in applying
more advanced econometric techniques to break the simultaneity
of criminal justice policy and crime rates is Steven Levitt. He
attempted to untangle the causal effect of incarceration rates on
crime by using an "instrumental variables" or "natural experiments" approach.3 6 The word "experiment" describes this methodology because it proceeds from an analogy to medical or laboratory experimentation. Ideally, a social scientist seeking to determine the effect of incarceration rates on crime would like to vary
the frequency of imprisonment in one set of jurisdictions and observe what happens to crime rates subsequently. In order to exclude the possibility of other contemporaneous influences, the
scientist would prefer to compare the outcomes to those in a similarly situated group of jurisdictions whose rates of incarceration
were not varied.
The nature of the ideal comparison is worth noting. In effect,
would ideally compare a "treatment" group of jurisscientist
the
dictions before and after the administration of the treatment,
which here would be an increase in the incarceration rate, to an
otherwise similar or "control" group of jurisdictions over the
same timeframe. The scientist would thus examine two dimensions of comparison: treatment versus control, and before treatment versus after treatment. Borrowing these concepts, economists often refer to such comparisons as "difference-indifferences" because this approach draws comparisons across two
dimensions."
The difficulties with conducting such actual experiments are
evident. The exposure of some persons to a higher risk of incarceration and others to a possible higher risk of crime raise significant ethical questions, and the undertaking would be very
costly in monetary terms. Social scientists instead seek to study
instances in which such variations in policies occur without the
direct intervention of an experimenter. When such spontaneous
variations create effective treatment and control groups, social
scientists often call them "natural experiments." The phenomenon creating the natural experiment is often referred to as an
35 See, for example, Marvell and Moody, 10 J Quantitative Criminol at 120-21 (cited
in note 34) (surveying four regression or correlation studies that estimate the impact of
prison populations on crime rates differently).
36 Levitt, 111 Q J Econ at 323 (cited in note 21).
31 See Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainthan, How Much
Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates? (NBER Working Paper 8841,
2002), available at <http-/www.nber.org.papers/w8841> (last visited June 1, 2005)
(describing the wide use and limitations of difference-in-differences estimators).
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"instrumental variable." The instrumental variable affects the
policy that is under consideration but otherwise unrelated to, or
"exogenous" to, the outcome of interest. In the context of prisons
and crime, an instrumental variable would induce movement in
the rate of incarceration but the instrument would be otherwise
unrelated to the incidence of crime. A natural experiment or a
variable that satisfies the conditions for a valid instrument
therefore allows the plausible identification of causal flows.
Although the instrumental variables methodology is not specific to economics, empirical economists have made most frequent
use of it. In an influential paper, Steven Levitt employed the instrumental variables methodology to identify the causal relationship between prisons and crime.38 Levitt argued that a set of instrumental variables that permitted the identification of the
causal effect of prisons on crime was prison overcrowding litigation." Lawsuits sponsored by the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU") alleged that overcrowded conditions in prisons violated
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.4 ° Levitt showed that when courts ordered reductions in overcrowding in response to these suits, states often
complied by releasing prisoners who would otherwise have been
incarcerated. 4 ' He argued these ACLU-sponsored suits were
valid instrumental variables because they induced variation in
prison populations but, after controlling for other factors, were
otherwise unrelated to a state's crime rate.42
Court orders issued in response to these suits permitted a
"difference-in-differences"-type comparison. Crime rates in states
where the suits produced such orders were compared before and
after the issuance of the orders, as well as relative to crime rates
in states without such litigation during the same time periods.43
Levitt's analysis showed that states that released prisoners as a
result of the litigation experienced a simultaneous rise in crime
rates relative to other states." In other words, lower incarcera38 Levitt, 111 QJ Econ at 328-36 (cited in note 21).
39 Id at 323.

Id at 323-24.
Id at 325.
42 Levitt, 111 Q J Econ at 323 (cited in note 21) (noting that state prison overcrowding litigation is related to crime rates only through its impact on prison population because "tests of overidentifying restrictions are consistent with the exogeneity of the instruments across all of the specifications considered [and] changes in litigation status
appear to affect crime rates, but not vice versa").
43 Id at 327-36.
a4 Id at 337-44.
40

41
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tion rates appeared to cause increased crime rates. 4' His estimates implied that the release of an additional prisoner associated with approximately fifteen additional crimes per year.4 6
Using his estimates of the effect of prisons on crime, Levitt
conducted a cost/benefit analysis of incarcerating the marginal
offender. Having found evidence consistent with the economic
model of crime, he sought to determine whether incarceration
was an efficient crime-control policy.4 7 At the time of his study,
he concluded that the crime-reducing benefits of incarceration
appeared to exceed its costs. 4 In the wake of the continued rapid
growth in prison populations in subsequent years, Levitt has retreated from that conclusion.4 9
Levitt's study and others that similarly attempt to identify
causal flows provide compelling evidence that increases in prison
populations cause reductions in crime rates.5 ° Where economists
have plausibly identified causation, an additional step in understanding the relationship between prisons and crime is to distinguish whether deterrence or incapacitation account for the estimated reductions in crime. Because the economic conception of
crime is a model of deterrence, empirical analyses that fail to
distinguish deterrence from incapacitation provide only a relatively weak test of the theory. In addition, understanding which
mechanism is operative is crucial for designing policies to combat
crime.
Although more work remains to be done, economists have
begun to explore the relative importance of deterrence versus
incapacitation. 5 ' Research on this subject also draws "differencein-differences"-type comparisons, and in doing so, it uses changes
in criminal punishments as sources of variation from which to
45 Id.
46

Levitt, 111 Q J Econ at 344-45 (cited in note 21).

41 Id at 344-48.
48

Id at 348.

49 See Levitt and Miles, The EmpiricalStudy of CriminalPuniishment(cited in note

3) (noting that "it appears that the current scale of incarceration is at or above the socially optimal level" because of the quick growth of the prison population).
ro See, for example, Marvell and Moody, 10 J Quantitative Criminol 109 (cited in note
34). Marvell and Moody examined time-series patterns in crime and imprisonment at the
state level. Id at 121-26. They found that a positive cross-sectional correlation exists
between incarceration and crime rates across states at a point in time. Id at 121. However, using an econometric technique called "Granger causation," they estimated that
increases in prison populations led to reductions in crime rates. Id at 129.
51 See Levitt, 36 Econ Inquiry 353 (cited in note 25) (attempting to discriminate between deterrence and incapacitation as possible causes for the relationship between arrest rates and crime). See also Shavell, 77 Am Econ Rev at 109-10 (cited in note 15) (concluding that sanctions differ when incapacitation is the goal rather than deterrence).
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identify the impact on criminal activity. For example, Daniel
Kessler and Steven Levitt studied the impact of a popular referendum in California that imposed sentence enhancements for
particular crimes.52 The affected offenses were serious crimes
that prior to the referendum were almost always punished by a
sentence of imprisonment. The sentence enhancements created a
source of variation in the length of prison terms and thus permitted three dimensions of comparison: (1) before and after the sentence enhancements; (2) offenses subject to the enhancements
and not; and (3) California versus other states.
A key insight of Kessler and Levitt's paper was that the sentence enhancements had an additional incapacitating effect only
upon the expiration of the conventional prison term, which was
the basic sentence without the enhancement.5 3 Any reduction in
crime occurring before the completion of the standard prison
term was therefore attributable to deterrence rather than incapacitation. 4 Kessler and Levitt observed that following the passage of the enhancements, the rate of crimes covered by the enhancements in California fell by four percent relative to the frequency of crimes not covered by enhancements.5 5 These estimates suggest that deterrence plays some role in influencing the
volume of criminal activity. To measure the full impact of the
sentence enhancements, Kessler and Levitt also examined the
rates of crimes after the expiration of the standard prison
terms. 6 They found further reductions in the incidence of the
affected crimes, indicating that incapacitation also accounts for
part of the crime-reducing impact of imprisonment.
In sum, empirical economists have contributed to the understanding of punishment and crime by employing empirical designs that more rigorously identify causal effects. When they
have found that policies, such as incarceration, reduce crime,
they have attempted to determine the channel through which
these reductions occur. Although more research on the question
is necessary, initial inquiries suggest that both deterrence and
incapacitation play roles in reducing crime.

52 Daniel Kessler and Steven D. Levitt, UsingSentence Enhancements to Distinguish
Between DeterrenceandIncapacitation,42 J L & Econ 343 (1999).
53 Id at 345.
54 Id.
55 Id at 359.
56 Kessler and Levitt, 42 J L & Econ at 359 (cited in note 52).
57 Id.
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II. CONDEMNATION AND EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF
CONSEQUENCES

A.

Condemnation and Consequences: An Example

Criminal punishment differs from other kinds of sanctions in
that it expresses condemnation of the offender's act.5" Because
criminal punishments bundle consequences and condemnation
together, a proper analysis of punishment requires analysis of
both dimensions. A number of law enforcement devices use public condemnation directly in an effort to produce tangible outcomes. In so doing, they draw upon existing attitudes toward offenders while simultaneously helping to shape these views. The
justification for the registries is that they allow citizens to take
precautions or to assist public law enforcement and thus reduce
the incidence of such crimes. However, critics doubt the purported crime-reducing effect of such policies and note the
strongly, perhaps excessively, condemnatory nature of these policies. Empirical economics, by providing a rigorous evaluation of
the impact of such policies, can help determine whether the purported consequentialist justifications have any validity.
An example of this sort of inquiry is recent work examining
the impact of the television program Amezica's Most Wanted
("AMW'). This program appears to have both consequentialist
and expressive dimensions. Its sponsors claim that it has a substantial impact in apprehending fugitives, but in its efforts to do
so, it expresses spirited condemnation of offenders.
For readers unfamiliar with AfW the program publicizes
fugitives, purportedly in order to facilitate their capture. At the
beginning of each broadcast, a tally of fugitives who have been
located through viewer tips or as "direct results" of the show fills
the screen.59 The show airs at 9:00 PM Eastern time on Saturdays on the Fox Television Network. The program displays photographs of the featured fugitive and provides descriptions of his
physical appearance and habits. One of the most controversial
58 See, for example, Dan Kahan, SocialInfluence, SocialMeaning,and Deterrence,83

Va L Rev 349, 383 (1997) ("Punishment does more than impose disutility on the offender;
it also expresses the community's moral condemnation."). Compare John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Does "Unlawful"Mean "Crimina..Reflections on the DisappearingTort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 BU L Rev 193, 193-94 (1991) ("[T]he factor that most distinguishes the criminal law is its operation as a system of moral education and socialization.
... Far more than tort law, the criminal law is a system for public communication of
values.").
59At the time of this draft, that number is 857.
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parts of the broadcast is its re-enactment of crimes.6" Most of the
fugitives sought by the television program are wanted for violent
offenses, and therefore, the re-enactments of the offenses are often vivid. Program producers argue that the violent depictions
are an integral component of the show's effectiveness in that the
violence motivates viewer interest. 6 1 Interviews with witnesses,
victims (if still living), and victims' family members offer additional details and elicit viewer empathy.6 2 The host, victims'
rights advocate John Walsh, asks viewers with information on
the whereabouts of the featured fugitives to call the program's
phone bank (1-800-CRIMETV). Telephone operators allow callers
to remain anonymous and forward their tips to the relevant law
enforcement authorities for investigation.
Legal scholars, to the extent that they ever refer to the program, lament the program's dubious entertainment value.6 3 Critics of the show contend that it promotes vindictive attitudes.'r By
its own admission, the program uses vivid language to denounce
the fugitives it features. 5 When the network revived it from a
planned cancellation in 1996, its producers consciously chose to
ramp up its rhetoric in order to stimulate viewer interest. The
program added a subtitle with a retributivist or even vengeful
theme: America Fights Back.6 6 Host Walsh regularly denounces
offenders personally. 67 Other critics argue that the show rein60 See Anna Williams, Domestic Violence and the Aetiology of Crime in America's
Most Wanted, 31 Camera Obscura 97, 101 (1993) (finding that Walsh's introductions to
the re-enactments of crimes implies "that they are documentary evidence," thereby conflating criminal justice and television drama).
61 See John Walsh and Philip Lerman, No Mercy 252 (Pocket Star 1998) ("[W]hen we
do tone down the violence, we always get heat from the police. 'You didn't show how violent that guy was,' they'd say. 'How horrible the crime was. How mutilated the victim
was. Nobody's gonna want to turn this guy in 'cause you didn't make it look like he did
anything all that bad.'").
62 See id at 35-36.
63 See Rosanna Cavallaro, Police and Thieves, 96 Mich L Rev 1435, 1454 (1998) (referring to "the tabloid world of true crime stories and 'America's Most Wanted'"); Matt
Henneman, PublicInterest v. P'ivateJustice,21 Am J Crim L 335, 335 (1994) (lamenting
"the downward spiral of popular culture that has produced 'reality' television such as
'America's Most Wanted).
64 See Lynne Henderson, Revisiting Victim s Rights, 1999 Utah L Rev 383, 395-96
(1999) ("[AMWhost] John Walsh... can be seen regularly preaching his gospel of rage
and revenge in television spots and on 'America's Most Wanted.'").
65 See, for example, note 61.
66 Walsh and Lerman, No Mercy at 395-96 (cited in note 61).
67 Program managers debated the sorts of names that Walsh could call the offenders
on air. One example of the sorts of language the show uses suffices:
'This is one of the most heartbreaking cases we've ever been involved in. Police
say [the fugitive] is capable of anything. This guy has gotta be taken down. Justice
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forces and accentuates the fear of crime.6" Others point out that
it endorses undesirable crime-control policies.69 In sum, those
who voice concerns about the program maintain that it conveys
condemnation that is excessive in both quantity and kind.
The nature of the legal challenges brought by criminal defendants who have previously been featured on the show provide
further evidence of AMWs unambiguous condemnations. They
typically assert one of two claims: (1) that the broadcast was a
form of prejudicial pre-trial publicity; or (2) that testimony about
the defendant's appearance on the program was improperly admitted. Despite the program's strong language, criminal defendants usually fail in these claims. With respect to claims that an
AMWbroadcast prejudices jurors, only one court has concluded
that the airing was inflammatory.70 Typically, courts deny motions for changes of venue on account of the broadcast and instead, during voir dire, inquire whether prospective jurors saw
the broadcast. In some cases, jurors did not see it,71 but when
jurors have seen it, some courts dismissed them for cause.7 2 In
other cases, courts have permitted jurors who stated that the
broadcast did not affect their ability to be fair to remain on the

for this devastated family starts with you. So let's get busy. The next time I see
[this fugitive's] face, I wanna see bars in front of it.'
It was the tone I wanted to set for the new show. Stop pretending to be objective
about these cases. Let's get the scumbag.
(The producers spent about two weeks arguing over whether I could say "scumbag" on the air, by the way. We decided it was okay-but then our viewers objected.
They thought it wasn't dignified. So I mostly stopped using it.)
Id at 410.
68 See Williams, 31 Camera Obscura at 101 (cited in note 60) ("The show represents
crime as an insidious omnipresent threat which preys on 'ordinary people' without warning.").
69 See Gray Cavender and Lisa Bond-Maupin, Fearand Loathing on Reality Television: An Analysis of "America'sMost Wanted" and 'Unsolved Mysteries", 63 Soc Inquiry
305, 315 (1993) ("Modern danger legitimizes public surveillance. Forging a partnership
between the police, the media, and the audience, these programs encourage wide dispersal of community social control.").
70 State v Garrett, 466 SE2d 481, 485 n 3 (W Va 1995) (noting that the trial court
impaneled a jury from a neighboring county because of the "inflammatory nature" of a
broadcast that depicted defendant "as a brutal, hard-drinking and violent person who
stalked the victim at her home on the night before he shot her"). But see People v King,
1996 WL 33362221, *1-2 (Mich App) (per curiam) (finding that there was no showing of
actual prejudice or that the publicity from AMWwas "inflammatory").
71 United States v Bruce, 1996 WL 640468, *4-5 (6th Cir) (noting that none of the
jurors had seen the "tabloid television program").
72 State v Van Ti-an, 864 SW2d 465, 473 (Tenn 1993) (denying a motion for a change
of venue and dismissing for cause the only juror who saw the AMW broadcast); King,
1996 WL 33366221 at *2.
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jury.73 Challenges to the admission of a defendant's appearance
on the show have also met with limited success. When the defendant is charged with unlawful flight, courts have generally found
his appearance on AMW relevant, particularly to consciousness
of guilt.74 When the defendant is not charged with unlawful
flight, courts often have concluded that the testimony about the
broadcast is improper, but harmless in view of the evidence of
guilt. 5 Although the condemnatory nature of the program is a
common a legal issue for fugitives apprehended by the show, the
lack of success of such challenges suggests that program's denunciations do not threaten the fairness of a prosecution or require procedural correctives to remedy any unfairness.
B.

Assessing Whether Publicity Has Consequences for Fugitives

Even if the condemnations of the program do not jeopardize
the fairness of subsequent legal proceedings or raise the cost of
prosecuting the offender, it is unclear whether the program provides the purported benefit of faster apprehensions. Casual observation suggests that AMWhas some role in hastening apprehensions. Judicial opinions often note when a criminal defendant
appeared on the program, even if it was not relevant to the legal
issues in the case. Many of these opinions implicitly suggest that
73 People v Bolin, 956 P2d 374, 388 (Cal 1998) (noting that jurors who had seen the
broadcast gave assurances that they would decide the case only on the basis of courtroom
evidence). See also People v White, 2004 WL 1683045, *13-14 (Cal App) (finding no misconduct, no bias, and no prejudice when a juror admitted during deliberations that he had
seen the AMWairing about defendant because he stated he had not yet made up his mind
about defendant's guilt).
74 Commonwealth v Kane, 2004 WL 136353, *3-4 (Mass App) (finding a prosecutor's
mention of AMW unnecessary but relevant to defendant's alleged flight and consciousness of guilt); People v Slater,701 NYS2d 371, 372 (NY App 2000) (admitting testimony
about AMW as part of the effort to locate defendant as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt); State v Korecky, 1995 WL 360303, *5 (Ohio App) (holding that brief
mention of AMWhad some relevance to the charge of fleeing and the probative value was
not substantially outweighed by potential prejudice). But see State v Thcker, 2002 WL
1378947, *8-9 (Ohio App) (finding that testimony about AMWwas unnecessary to establish fugitive status and should have been excluded).
75 Ford v Curtis, 277 F3d 806, 811 (6th Cir 2002) (noting that the evidence of defendant's AMWappearance was improperly admitted but was harmless because evidence of
guilt was overwhelming); Ca-r v State, 689 So2d 283, 286 (Fla App 1996) (finding the
jury's exposure to defendant's largely exculpatory statement that she was not the "animal" depicted on AMW harmless). See also Caudill v Commonwealth, 120 SW3d 635,
662-63 (Ky 2003) (stating that testimony that defendant appeared on AMWdid not necessitate a mistrial); Bray v Commonwealth, 68 SW3d 375, 383-85 (Ky 2002) (same). But
see Wilding v State, 674 So2d 114, 119 (Fla 1996) (concluding that testimony mentioning
defendant's AMWappearance was clearly "irrelevant and highly prejudicial").
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the program has facilitated the capture of the defendants by noting that the defendant's arrest followed the AMW broadcast."
Other cases expressly state that the broadcast produced the tips
that led police to the defendant's location." In some cases, the
show's graphic depiction of the crime or its detailed description of
the offender motivated persons in the fugitive's household to tip
off the authorities.78
76 See United States v Tampico, 297 F3d 396, 398 (5th Cir 2002) (per curiam) (AMW
airing "led to" defendant's arrest); Johnson v Reilly, 349 F3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir 2000)
(defendant located "[a]lmost immediately" after the broadcast of his profile on AMW the
"popular crime-fighting television show"); United States vHyde, 1991 WL 270789, *1 (9th
Cir 1991) (defendant arrested following an episode of AMW that featured his offense);
Biernat v Staub, 2002 WL 31236202, *1 (E D Mich 2002) (defendant arrested after an
AMW broadcast); State v Wilson, 92 P3d 729, 729 (Or 2004) (defendant apprehended
following an AMW broadcast); Manley v State, 979 P2d 703, 711 (Nev 1999) (defendant
caught after having been made subject of an AMW episode); Commonwealth v Knd/er,
722 A2d 143, 145 (Pa 1998) (defendant arrested subsequent to a broadcast on AMW);
Commonwealth vMrozek, 703 A2d 1052, 1054 n 2 (Pa 1997) (same); Jenkins v State, 391
SE2d 397, 399 (Ga 1990) (defendant arrested following AMWbroadcast); Commonwealth
vJackmon, 822 NE2d 754, 756 (Mass App 2005) (defendant arrested after AMWaired his
photograph); Chandler v Sundquist, 107 SW3d 538, 538 (Tenn App 2002) (defendant
arrested after an AMW broadcast); State v Volgares, 1999 WL 354335, *2 (Ohio App
1999) (defendant arrested less than one hour after AMWaired his profile); Garrett,466
SE2d at 485 (defendant arrested "apparently after he was featured on 'America's Most
Wanted"); United States v Willis, 43 MJ 889, 893 (AF Ct Crim App 1996) (defendant
captured after AMWfeatured a vignette of his alleged crime).
77 See United States v Henderson, 241 F3d 638, 643 (9th Cir 2000) (defendant arrested following an anonymous tip to AMBM; United States v Oliver, 118 F3d 562, 564
(7th Cir 1997) (FBI arrested defendant after being "[t]ipped off through America's Most
Wanted'); State v Cisco, 861 S2d 118, 123 n 8 (La 2003) (AMWbroadcast generated a
citizen tip); Kane, 2004 WL 136353 at *3 (citizen tip received following an AMWbroadcast led to the location of defendant); Goodwin v Superior Court,2004 WL 870470, *3 (Cal
App 2004) (neighbor contacted authorities after viewing the case on AMW); State v Jang,
819 A2d 9, 12 (NJ App 2003) (broadcast of AMWresulted in a tip of defendant's location
and eventually led to his surrender); State v Cavaye, 2002 WL 31769092, *2 (Tenn Crim
App 2002) (bartender informed authorities of defendant's presence following an AMW
broadcast); Commonwealth v Mller, 724 A2d 895, 898 (Pa 1999) (defendant arrested
after receipt of a tip following the airing of a description of the unsolved crime on AMW;
Henderson v State, 962 SW2d 544, 548 (Tex Crim App 1997) (tips regarding defendant's
whereabouts received following AMW broadcast); State v Clark, 936 P2d 1215, 1216
(Wash App 1997) (defendant arrested "[flollowing a tip generated by the television program America's Most Wanted'); Lopez v State, 1994 WL 585766, *2 (Tex App 1994) (defendant located following an anonymous tip received after an AMWbroadcast); State v
Coats, 1994 WL 547745, *2 (Ohio App 1994) (further investigation for an episode of AMW
led to defendant's arrest); State v BiKht, 505 SE2d 317, 319 (NC App 1988) (defendant
captured based on tips received in response to broadcasts on AMWand Unsolved Mysteries). See also Commonwealth v Maisonet, 1997 WL 1433742, *1 (Pa 1997) (defendant
arrested "with the assistance of the TV program, America's Most Wanted'); George v
State, 717 S2d 844, 845 n 1 (Ala 1996) (defendant arrested "as a result of an episode of
the television show America's Most Wanted').
78 See Huggins v State, 889 S2d 743, 752 n 3 (Fla 2004) (describing how after seeing
AMWs profile of the case, a woman reported to police that she suspected her sister's
boyfriend of the murder); State v Tucker, 2002 WL 1378947, *2 (Ohio App 2002) (noting
how after watching AIW a relative of defendant's girlfriend grew suspicious, searched
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Although the number and nature of these apprehensions
strongly suggest that the program's broadcasts result in some
captures, they are only indirect evidence that the show systematically raises the likelihood of apprehension. These figures are
simple tallies, rather than a rate, of apprehensions. Moreover,
they are not relative to a baseline or counterfactual rate of apprehensions that would have prevailed in the absence of the program. Perhaps just as many fugitives would have been apprehended in the absence of the program as were apprehended in its
presence.
The program might have no effect or a negative effect on the
rate of apprehensions for several reasons. First, the program's
viewers may not pay enough attention to the program to remember the characteristics of the offender when they encounter a
person matching the description. Eyewitness identifications are
notoriously inaccurate, and therefore it seems unlikely that
viewers' recollections would have sufficient accuracy to generate
positive leads.7 9 Second, the police and the program producers
might conspire to feature the fugitives who already have a high
probability of capture. The program may feature fugitives with
high probabilities of apprehension in order to create a false impression of its effectiveness and thereby attract viewers. Similarly, law enforcement authorities may favor the appearance of a
high success rate in order to marshal public support for themselves. Third, even if the show's producers and law enforcement
are not in cahoots, the availability of the program may induce
police to alter the investigative techniques they employ or the
types of fugitives they pursue. If the program is a relatively less
effective investigative technique, then this substitution may actually cause the rate of apprehensions to fall. For these reasons,
an empirical evaluation that considers the rate of apprehensions
that would occur in the absence of the program is necessary.

defendant's luggage, and upon finding a wanted poster of defendant therein, contacted
authorities); Edwards v Commonwealth, 457 SE2d 797, 799 (Va App 1995) (explaining
that defendant's former wife testified that because of her fear of defendant, she did not
contact the police until after she viewed a re-enactment of the crime on AMW).
79 See, for example, Peter N. Shapiro and Steven D. Penrod, Meta-analysis of Facial
Identification Studies, 100 Psychol Bull 139, 144 (1986) (using a meta-analysis of 128
eyewitness identification and facial recognition studies to find that following the introduction of minor facial alterations, such as the addition or removal of a hat or eyeglasses,
identification rates typically dropped from 75% to 54% and misidentifications rose from
22% to 30%).
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Thomas Miles assessed the efficacy of AMW in influencing
the rate of apprehensions."0 He examined a sample of fugitives
who appeared on wanted posters and compared them to a subset
of fugitives who also appeared on AMW In effect, fugitives who
appeared on the program were a treatment group, and fugitives
who did not appear on it were a control or comparison group. Fugitives featured on wanted posters were a plausible comparison
group, because their presence on wanted posters indicated that
law enforcement was actively pursuing them and was seeking
the public's assistance in doing so. The television broadcast exposed the fugitives to an even greater degree of publicity than
the wanted posters did. The timing of broadcasts provided a second dimension of comparison and permitted a "difference-indifferences"-type evaluation of the program. If an appearance on
America's Most Wanted raised the probability of a fugitive's apprehension, the increase should occur only after the date of
broadcast, but not at other times. Thus, Miles's analysis compares apprehension rates of those who appear on the program (a
treatment group) during the month of their individual broadcasts
to the apprehension rates in other months, as well as relative to
fugitives who never appear on the show (a comparison group).
Miles found that the rates of apprehension in the comparison group were low, less than two percent per month, and that
these rates declined steadily over time.8 ' However, his estimates
showed that the risk of apprehension during the month of the
AMWbroadcast for fugitives profiled on the show was nearly an
order of magnitude higher.8 2 Thus, the program appeared to raise
the risk of apprehension significantly, but the impact was temporary. In subsequent months, the apprehension risk fell and was
indistinguishable from that of fugitives who did not appear on
the program. The estimates imply that for the typical fugitive
featured on the show, his apprehension occurred roughly two
years sooner.8 3
Just as many studies of the crime-reducing effect of prisons
often do not distinguish whether deterrence or incapacitation is
the operative mechanism, Miles's estimates of the impact of
AMWdo not isolate the channel that hastens apprehensions. The
program could alter the behavior of fugitives, their pursuers, or
80 Thomas J. Miles, Estimating the Effect ofAmerica's Most Wanted: A Duration
Analis
of Wanted Fugitives,48 J L & Econ 281 (2005).
81 Id at 300.
82 Id.

83 Id at 302.
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both. For example, the program may generate viewer tips, and
these investigative leads may improve the efficacy of police efforts. Alternatively, if fugitives are aware that they are the subject of an AMWbroadcast, they may alter their behavior. Some
fugitives may become more desperate and commit additional offenses in an effort to further their flight. One fugitive confessed
after his apprehension that he saw "a 'promo' for America's Most
Wanted indicating that he would be featured in an upcoming
program.... Fearing discovery, he went to San Francisco and
there he killed" a person to prevent his discovery." However, in
other instances, fugitives have surrendered to authorities after
learning that they were the subject of an AMW profile. 5 Although Miles's estimates do not directly measure the channel
through which apprehensions are facilitated, the number of opinions indicating that fugitives were aware of the broadcast suggests that a fugitive's behavioral response to the broadcast may
account for at least part of the program's impact.8 6
84 State v Cohen, 1991 WL 236929, *13 (Del 1991). During his confession, defendant
described how the advertisement for the next week's episode announced that it would
feature the case of a "punk rocker drummer and stripper who killed his parents, and
[Cohen realized] I knew then it was me, 'cause that description.... it's vague, but it's still
pretty much me." Id at *32. Opinions also offer some anecdotal evidence that the notoriety of the program motivates some fame-seeking criminals to commit offenses. See 'ields
v State, 923 P2d 624, 628 (Ok Crim App 1996) (asserting that defendant confessed to
killing and was not sorry for it because he wanted to be featured on AMW; Robertson v
State, 871 SW2d 701, 704 (Tex Crim App 1993) (quoting defendant's admission to officers
that his crimes were so severe, "I figured I'd be on America s Most Wanted TV show by
now"). In other instances, the program may convince fugitives to redouble their efforts to
avoid detection. See, for example, State vArmstrong, 93 P3d 1061, 1066 (Ariz 2004) (noting that a defendant informed his girlfriend of an AMW broadcast that described his
involvement in two murders and attempted to convince her to flee with him); Aylor v
State, 1997 WL 136479, *5 (Tex App 1997) (describing witness testimony that defendant
decided to leave for Mexico after AMWbroadcast her story).
85 See State v Ellen, 500 NW2d 818, 820 (Neb 1993) (after living under an assumed
name for two years, defendant surrendered upon seeing himself on AMW); People v Martinez, 2004 WL 2634621, *2 (Cal App 2004) (after a co-worker recognized him from an
AMWbroadcast, a fugitive considered fleeing to Mexico but turned himself into authorities instead); Jang, 819 A2d at 12 (broadcast of AMW resulted in a tip of defendant's
location and eventually led to his surrender); Nguyen v State, 1991 WL 63601, *1 (Tex
App 1991) (defendant turned himself into authorities approximately one week after he
was featured on an episode of AMW.
86 See, for example, United States vBowman, 215 F3d 951, 959-60 n 3, 961 (9th Cir
2000) (holding that a co-conspirator's statement that defendants had been featured on
AMW was admissible under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule); United
States v Scarpa, 897 F2d 63, 66 (2d Cir 1990) (noting that when an officer asked if defendant had seen his profile on AMW, defendant laughed and said that he had); State v
Moody, 94 P3d 1119, 1131 (Ariz 2004) (detailing grand jury testimony about a suspect's
bragging that he had committed murders and had been featured on AMW); Commonwealth v Watkins, 843 A2d 1203, 1218 n 17 (Pa 2003) (stating that defendant admitted he
saw himself on AMW; Bruce v State, 569 A2d 1254, 1258-59 (Md 1990) (finding that
when an officer asked if defendant had seen the re-enactment of his crime on AMW, de-
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Using these estimates, Miles attempted to approximate
whether the benefits of quicker apprehensions exceed the social
costs. These costs include the opportunity costs of the police officers' time in assisting in the production of the show, the costs of
incarcerating the offender, and the opportunity costs of broadcasting a different program in lieu of AMW Miles's estimates
suggest that the program may provide social benefits, but several
quantities were difficult to measure. Perhaps the most important
of these is the incidence of false arrests. The case law contains
some examples of allegations of false arrests resulting from the
program's broadcasts,8 7 but the full extent of the broadcastinduced false arrests and their frequency relative to that of
wanted persons not featured on the program are unknown. One
factor potentially contributing to a higher rate of false arrest
among fugitives featured on AMW is that the program has eschewed liability under section 1983,88 because falsely arrested
persons have not been able to establish that the television program was acting under color of state law. 9 The program itself
does not execute arrests. Law enforcers remain responsible for
determining whether viewer tips establish probable cause for
arrest and face liability when they fail to do so.9"
The study of AMWillustrates how empirical economics may
help evaluate criminal justice institutions that have significant
expressive features and yet claim consequential effects. Techniques such as "difference-in-differences" comparisons allow
fendant responded that he had and that it was "pretty close" to correct).
87 See, for example, Maxwell v City of Indianapolis,998 F2d 431 (7th Cir 1993) (affirming a denial of summary judgment in a civil rights action brought by an individual
who was arrested after his co-workers incorrectly identified him as a fugitive featured on

AMW.
88 Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 USC § 1983 (2000) (creating liability for individuals
who, under color of law, deprive a citizen of any rights, privileges, or immunities granted
by the Constitution).
89 See, for example, All v Moore, 984 SW2d 224, 228 (Tenn App 1998) (affirming
summary judgment for defendant, Fox Television Broadcasting, in a § 1983 action on the
ground that defendant failed to demonstrate that Fox's broadcast of episodes of AMW
featuring defendant constituted activities that were "under color of" state law).
90 In Maxwell, the court affirmed the denial of summary judgment in a § 1983 action
against police officers who arrested a suspect after his co-workers alleged that he
matched the profile of a fugitive featured on AMW. 998 F2d at 436. The court held that
discrepancies between the appearance of the fugitive and the arrestee were so great that
a jury could reasonably conclude that probable cause was not supported. Id at 434-36.
Moreover, the court concluded that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. Id
at 436. But see Delgado v City ofLos Angeles, 1995 WL 341515, *1 (9th Cir 1995) (affirming a grant of summary judgment in favor of federal agents in a Bivens action because the
plaintiff failed to show that the officers lacked a reasonable belief that the plaintiff was
the individual named on the arrest warrant and that they acted with malice).
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more convincing examination of the causal effects of a policy intervention. These resulting estimates are often crucial to the
evaluation of whether the policy provides a net social benefit.
The estimated increase in the probability of a fugitive's apprehension, for example, is evidence that this particular institution
has an impact on criminal activity. The program is not exclusively expressive or entertainment. Moreover, this estimate is a
key parameter in assessing whether the AMWprogram provides
a net social benefit. A complete evaluation requires estimates of
other quantities that are still more difficult to measure, but the
estimated increase in the apprehension hazard provides at least
a bound on how large other costs must be to render the program
a social loss.
CONCLUSION

Empirical economics has a significant contribution to make
to the understanding of punishment and crime. It builds on the
crisp behavioral implications of the fundamental rational-choice
model of criminal behavior and finds avenues in which to test
those predictions. More so than other methodological approaches,
it pays close attention to issues of causation. By attempting to
identify causal directions, it provides a relatively rigorous test of
the rational choice model and provides the evidence most helpful
to criminal justice policymakers. For scholars who emphasize the
moral and expressive functions of criminal law and punishment,
empirical economics provides a valuable tool. Criminal punishment often bundles together condemnation and consequences,
and by measuring the consequences with some precision, empirical economics helps assess the relative importance of these two
functions. By measuring whether a policy has any causal impact
on criminal activity, empirical economics helps determine the
validity of consequential justifications for criminal justice programs. Finally, measures of the effects of a policy are important
parameters in evaluating whether a policy provides net social
benefits.

